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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Prescriptions Issued to Deceased and. Fictitious Patients 
Are Forgeries Under New York Penal Law 
Although Signed With True Name of 
Issuing Doctor-People v. Klein* 
Defendant, a licensed New York physician, issued five prescrip-
tions for narcotics, signing his own name and giving his correct ad-
dress and narcotics registry number. On four of the prescriptions 
deceased patients were represented as the intended recipients of the 
drugs; on the fifth the name of a fictitious patient was used. The 
defendant used these forms to obtain the prescribed narcotics and 
administered them to an addict. He was convicted of ten counts of 
third-degree forgery under sections 889-b and 881 of the New York 
Penal Law.1 On appeal, _held, affirmed. Prescriptions issued to de-
ceased and fictitious patients are forgeries under New York law, not-
withstanding the fact that they are signed with the true name of the 
doctor who executes them. 
The New York Penal Law, like that of many other states, makes 
"forgery" a criminal offense but sets forth no definition for this gen-
eral term.2 It is apparently assumed that since forgery was a crime 
at common law, the boundaries of the offense have been sufficiently 
delineated in its historical d~velopment.8 This assumption is unwar-
• People v. Klein, 23 App. Div. 2d 95, 258 N.Y.S.2d 783, rev'd, 154 N.Y.L.J. p. 16, 
col. 2, (Ct. App, Dec. 3, 1965) (hereinafter cited as principal case). 
I. For each of the five unlawful prescriptions, ·the defendant was convicted of 
one count of third-degree forgery for having violated N.Y. PEN. LA,v § 889-b, which 
provides that "a person who shall falsely make, alter, forge or counterfeit a doctor's 
prescription, or utter the same, shall be guilty of forgery in the third degree," and 
of a second count for violating N.Y. PEN. LAw § 881, which provides that "a person 
who •.• utters, offers, disposes of or puts off as true ••. a forged .•• instrument 
or writing, or other thing, the false making, forging or altering of which is punishable 
as forgery, is guilty of forgery in the same degree as if he had forged the same." 
2. "The expressions 'forge,' 'forged,' and 'forging' as used in this article, include 
false making, counterfeiting, and the alteration .•. of a genuine instrument in whole 
or in part •.•• " N.Y. PEN. LAw § 880. False making and counterfeiting are merely 
synonyms for the term "forgery" and do not define that term. See Greathouse v. 
United States, 170 F.2d 512, 514 (4th Cir. 1948): "The words 'falsely made, forged, 
altered or counterfeited' •.• are ejusdem generis and are usually employed to denounce 
the crime of forgery. Indeed it may be said that when used in an association of this 
kind the words 'falsely made' and 'forged' are substantially synonymous •.•• " See also 
Marteney v. United States, 216 F.2d 760, 763 (10th Cir. 1954). One of the primary sources 
of confusion in the law of forgery is the use of the term "false making" in the definition 
of forgery. False making in the forgery context has a far more restricted meaning 
than would be expected from the common usage of this term. Semantic problems 
result when it is necessary to distinguish between the false making of an instrument 
and the making of false statements in an instrument, but the distinction is an 
important one. 
3. See People v. Berman, 197 N.Y.S.2d 346 (Sup. Ct. 1960), where it was said that 
the New York definition of forgery is intended to embrace all that was included in 
the common-law definition. 
[513] 
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ranted, however, because there are two conflicting definitions of 
forgery, both having early common-law origins and supported by 
subsequent authority. A majority of those states which have no stat-
utory definition accept the so-called "narrow view,"4 which defines 
forgery as "the false making of a ·writing so as to make the writing 
appear to be that of another.''.5 Under this definition, any instrument 
issued by its actual maker as his own is considered a genuine doc~-
ment even if it contains false statements or purports to have some 
legal effect which it does not in fact have. 6 A minority of states, how-
ever, incorporate fraud into the forgery context and subscribe to 
the "broad view" of forgery: "the making of any instrument with 
the intent to defraud."7 This view encompasses not only the cases of 
false purported authorship recognized by the narrow view, but also 
writings which contain false statements if such documents are used 
to defraud.8 In order properly to apply the New York forgery stat-
utes, which leave the courts to the common law for the definition of 
the crime, a cou:rt must determine which of the above views prevails 
in New York. The court in the principal case, however, failed to 
take account of the vital distinction between the two positions. 
The case law of New York seems to evidence an acceptance of 
the narrow view of forgery. Several decisions expressly hold that in 
order to be "falsely made" a ·writing must purport to be that of one 
other than its maker.9 Most of the other forgery decisions, while not 
so explicit, reach results consistent with these holdings.10 In the sev-
4. See Annot., 41 A.L.R. 229 (1926), for a list of the states adhering to this view. 
5. In re Windsor, 6 B. &: S. 521, 527, 122 Eng. Rep. 1288, 1290 (K.B. 1865): "We 
must take forgery ••. to mean that which by universal acceptation it is understood 
to mean, namely the making or altering of a writing so as to make the writing or alter• 
ation purport to be the act of some person, which it is not." See also In re Phipps, 
8 Ont. App. 77 (1883). 
6. It should be noted that courts accepting this reasoning have held that a person 
may be guilty of forgery in signing his own name, in his own handwriting, if he 
represents himself to be another person who bears the same name. See, e.g., Peoples 
Trust Co. v. Smith, 215 N.Y. 488, 109 N.E. 561 (1915); Third Nat'l Bank v. Merchant's 
Nat'l Bank, 76 Hun 475, 27 N.Y.S. 1070 (Sup. Ct. 1874). 
7. This view was expressed in the leading case of Queen v. Ritson, L.R. 1 Cr. Cas. 
200 (Eng. 1869). The Ritson case relied primarily upon the Report of the English 
Commission on Criminal Law which said: "An offender may be guilty of a false 
making of an instrument although he sign and execute it in his own name, if it 
be false in any material part and be calculated to induce another to give credit to it 
as genuine when it is false and deceptive." ENG. Cru:1,r. LAw CoMM'N, FIFrH REPORT 
66 (1840). 
8. Several states have expressly accepted this view. In Ohio v. Havens, 91 Ohio App. 
578, 109 N.E.2d 48 (1951), the court rejected as meaningless the distinction between 
false making and false written statements, and subsequently in the case of In re 
Clemmons, 168 Ohio St. 83, 151 N.E.2d 553 (1958), a man was convicted of forgery 
for issuing a check in his own name, on a bank in which he had no account. Sec 
also Illinois v. Mau, 377 Ill. 199, 36 N.E.2d 235 (1941). The latter two decisions were 
respectively criticized in 72 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 565 (1958) and 26 MARQ. L. R.Ev. 165 (1942), 
9. E.g., International Union Bank v. National Sur. Co., 245 N.Y. 368, 157 N.E. 269 
(1927); People v. Mann, 75 N.Y. 484, 31 Am. Rep. 482 (1878). 
10. Sec, e.g., People v. Berman, 197 N.Y.S.2d 346 (Sup. Ct. 1960). Sec also Fitz-
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eral New York cases whose outcome cannot be reconciled with the 
narrow view of forgery, the courts nevertheless adhered to this view 
in theory,11 using fictions to encompass within the restricted view of-
fenses which, in the absence of such artificiality, could constitute 
forgery only if the broader view were applied.12 That the courts felt 
it necessary to resort to this indirect approach would seem to be 
evidence that the narrow view of forgery was the accepted law in the 
jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, the New York Penal Law tacitly recognizes the 
narrow view of forgery. This is evidenced by several sections of the 
forgery article which expressly prohibit the making of certain writ-
ings which purport to be those of another.18 The theory of forgery 
inherent in this article is obscured, however, because the article also 
includes certain offenses involving only false written statements.14 
Although the effect of the incorporation of the latter offenses is to 
give the forgery article the expanded scope of the broad view, it was 
not intended that the theory of the broad view be adopted.15 False 
written statements are included in the forgery article of the Penal 
Law only because they are to be punished as if they were forgery, 
not because they are considered to be. forgery, as they would be un-
der the broad view.16 The theory of the forgery article is immaterial 
gibbon's Boiler Co. v. Employer's Life Assur. Corp., 105 F.2d 893, 895 (2d Cir. 1939), 
where the holding in International Union Bank v. National Sur. Co., supra note 9, was 
cited as the New York law of forgery and as having been followed in the majority of 
New York decisions. 
11. See, e.g., Schramm v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 224 App. Div. 573, 231 N.Y.S. 
554 (1928); People v. Filkin, 83 App. Div. 589, 82 N.Y.S. 15 (1903). 
12. In People v. Filkin, supra note 11, it was held that a former town clerk who 
executed official bounty certificates in his own name, but predated them to make it 
appear that they had been issued before the expiration of his term of office, actually 
held out the certificates as those of another person-a town clerk having the same 
name, but actually in office at the time of execution. 
13. E.g., N.Y. PEN. LAw § 884: "A person is guilty of forgery in the first degree 
who • • • forges • • • a will or codicil • • • or a deed or other instrument, being or 
purporting to be the act of another. . • ." 
14. E.g., N.Y. PEN. LAw § 889: "A person who .•• makes a false entry in any .•. 
account or book of accounts .•• is guilty of forgery in the third degree." 
15. See NEW YORK TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON R.EvlSION OF THE PENAL LAW AND 
CRIMINAL CODE, THIRD INTERIM REPORT 24 (Legis. Doc. 14, 1964): "[The Penal Law's] 
Forgery article (Art. 84), engaging in exhaustive and needless specificity and enumera-
tion, strings together in patternless style a series of miscellaneous offenses-some not 
even of the forgery genus." (Emphasis added.) The offenses referred to as not being 
of the forgery genus are those of making false written statements. E.g., N.Y. PEN. 
LAw § 889(2), quoted supra note 14. 
16. It was recognized at an early date that, although New York punished certain 
offenses as if they were "forgery," these offenses were not thought to constitute "true" 
forgery. In the case of In re Windsor, 6 B. & S. 521, 122 Eng. Rep. 1288 ~1865), New 
York sought the extradition of one who had allegedly committed the crime of 
"forgery" when he had violated a local statute making it forgery in the third degree 
to make false entries in the books of a corporation. England refused to deliver the 
accused, because the alleged offense was not within the meaning of "forgery" as used 
in the treaty provision concerning extradition. "Telling a lie does not become forgery 
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in situations where the penalties for forgery and the making of false 
written statements are the same,17 since in either case the defendant 
is punished as if he had committed forgery. 
The theory behind these offenses is of prime importance in the 
case at hand, however, because the forgery of a doctor's prescription 
is a felony under the Penal Law,18 whereas the making of false state-
ments therein is only a misdemeanor under the Public Health 
Law.19 It is thus imperative in this setting that the traditional, but 
often ignored, distinction between these offenses be recognized. Un-
der the Revised New York Penal Law,20 which will take effect in 
1967, the distinction between "forgery" and the "making of false 
written statements" is emphasized by treating these offenses individ-
ually in separate sections of the code.21 Section 170 of the revision 
defines a forged instrument as one "which purports to be an authen-
tic creation of its ostensible maker but which is not, either because 
the ostensible maker is fictitious or because, if real, he did not au-
thorize the making." The comments on this section state that it is 
not intended to change the existing law, but merely to eliminate 
some ambiguities in the forgery article of the preceding Penal 
Code.22 Thus, since the definition in the new code coincides with 
the narrow view of forgery,23 the Revised Penal Law substantiates 
because it is reduced to writing •••• It is true that the statute of New York says 
that such conduct shall be deemed to be forgery in the third degree • . • • The 
meaning of the New York statute is the party shall be punished as if for forgery." 
Id. at 530, 122 Eng. Rep. at 1292. (Emphasis added.) See People v. Gould, 41 Misc. 2d 
875, 246 N.Y.S.2d 758 (Westchester County Ct. 1964), where the defendant was acquit• 
ted of uttering a forged instrument because the instrument he executed and passed 
as his own contained only false statements of fact and was therefore not a forgery. 
The defendant was convicted of third degree forgery, however, because the making 
of false written statements was expressly prohibited by a section of the forgery article 
of the Penal Law. The ambiguous result of this case is that the defendant was con• 
victed of "forgery" after it was held that the instrument he executed was not forged. 
17. An example of identical punishments being prescribed for forgery and the 
making of false written statements is found in the following sections of the forgery 
article. N.Y. PEN. I.Aw § 882: "The false making or forging of an instrument or 
writing, purporting to have been issued by or on behalf of a corporation • • • and 
bearing the pretended signature of any person therein falsely indicated ••• is forgery 
in the same degree as if that person were, in truth, such officer •••• " N.Y. PEN, LAW 
§ 889: "A person who ••• makes a false entry in any such account or book of accounts 
[belonging to a corporation], is guilty of forgery in the third degree.'' 
18. N.Y. PEN. I.Aw § 889-b defines the offense as third-degree forgery, for which 
the penalty is imprisonment for a maximum of five years. N.Y. PEN. I.Aw § 893. 
19. "No person shall •.. wilfully make a fa!se statement in any prescription ••. .'' 
N.Y. Ptm. HEALTH I.Aw § 335l(l)(b). The penalty for a violation of this section, pre• 
scribed by N.Y. PEN. I.Aw § 1751-a, is a maximum fine of five hundred dollars or 
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both. 
20. N.Y. R.Evtsm PEN. I.Aw, effective Jan. I, 1967, enacted by L. 1965, cc. 1030, 1031. 
21. N.Y. R.EvlsED PEN. LAW art. 170 (Forgery and Related Offenses); art. 175 
(Offenses Involving False Written Statements). 
22. Commission Staff Notes, Proposed New York Penal Law 360 (McKinney 1964). 
23. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. 
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the proposition that the New York legislature has always intended 
that the narrow view of forgery be applied. 
If, as the foregoing discussion suggests, New Yark adheres to the 
narrow view of forgery, it would appear that the defendant's writ-
ings in the principal case were not forgeries. The prescriptions were 
signed by the defendant and issued as his own. As a licensed physi-
cian he had authority to order narcotics.24 The use of the names 
of deceased and fictitious patients merely constituted the making of 
false statements of fact, and was insufficient to make forgeries of the 
·writings in which the names were used. However, instead of at-
tempting to reconcile its decision with the law of New York, the 
court relied on the federal case of United States v. Tommasello,25 
which upheld a forgery conviction on facts seemingly almost iden-
tical to those of the principal case. Although Tommasello was de-
cided under federal law, the New York court apparently felt that 
the similarity of the applicable forgery laws26 justified its use as per-
suasive authority in the principal case. However, the Tommasello 
case has been expressly criticized by the United States Supreme 
Court27 and appears to be an anomaly in the federal law of forgery. 
The Court stated in a subsequent decision28 that the narrow view of 
forgery had been accepted by the federal courts29 and cited the Tom-
masello case as an improper extension of the accepted view.30 Simi-
larly, if the narrow view of forgery has been accepted in New York, 
the principal case is an anomaly with respect to the New York law 
of forgery. 
As mentioned above,31 the making of false ·written statements in 
a doctor's prescription for narcotics is a misdemeanor, whereas the 
forging of a doctor's prescription is a felony. Since New York has the 
greatest incidence of narcotics offenses in the United States,32 the 
prosecutor and court were justifiably concerned with finding the 
24. The actual authority of the defendant would preclude the application of the 
fiction used in some New York forgery cases in which it was reasoned that one who 
acts outside his authority purports to be another person. See note 12 supra. 
25. 160 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1947). 
26. See United States v. First Nat'! City Bank, 235 F. Supp. 894, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 
1964), where the federal forgery law and that of New York are said to be the same. 
27. Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.S. 650 (1962). · 
28. Id. at 658. 
29. See Marteney v. United States, 216 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1954); Greathouse v. 
United States, 170 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1948). Contra, United States v. First Nat'! City 
:Bank, 235 F. Supp. 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). 
30. An e.xcerpt from the Court's opinion in Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.S. 650, 
658 (1962), is relevant to the situation presented in the principal case: "Nor are we 
impressed with the argument that 'forge' • • • should be given a broader scope than 
its common law meaning because it is contained in a statute aimed at· protecting the 
government against fraud." 
31. See notes 18 &: 19 supra. 
32. See Cantor, Criminal Law and the Narcotics Problem, 51 J. CRIM. L., c. &: P.S. 
512, 518 (1961). 
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most effective means of deterring the unlawful distribution of drugs 
by physicians.33 Nevertheless, absent contrary legislative intent, stat-
utory language should be given its commonly accepted meaning.34 
In making the forgery of a doctor's prescription a felony, the legis-
lature showed no intention to broaden the definition of forgery,8G 
Furthermore, even if the existing definition of forgery or the legis-
lative intent concerning it were unclear, any doubt should be recon-
ciled in favor of the defendant, since penal statutes generally are to 
be narrowly construed.86 
The fact that the forgery statute should have been considered 
inapplicable in the principal case would not mean that a doctor who 
made· false statements in a narcotics prescription would be immune 
from prosecution. On the contrary, several statutory provisions 
would appear to have been violated by the defendant. Section 3351 
of the Public Health Law87 expressly prohibits the making of false 
written statements in a narcotics prescription. Furthermore, section 
3330 of the Public Health Law88 makes it a misdemeanor for a doc-
tor to dispense, administer, or prescribe narcotics other than in good 
faith in the normal course of his professional practice. Both of these 
sections of the Public Health Law have been used to prosecute doc-
tors on facts similar to those of the principal case.39 A violation of 
33. Up to the present time, steps taken to stop the unlawful distribution of nar• 
cotics have proved ·ineffective. The theory now advanced to remedy this situation is 
that the full vigor of punitive legislation should be directed toward non-addicted 
persons who traffic illegally in narcotics, as they have the free will which can be 
deterred. See Cantor, supra note 32, at 526. 
34. Cf. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952): "The spirit of the 
doctrine that denies to the federal judiciary power to create crimes forthrightly ad• 
monishes that we should not enlarge the reach of enacted crimes by construing them 
for anything less than the incriminating components contemplated by the words used 
in the statute. And where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the 
legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts 
the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning 
from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind 
unless otherwise instructed. In such cases, absence of contrary direction may be taken 
as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them," Sec 
also Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.S. 650 (1962), where the Supreme Court was called 
upon to determine the scope of the federal forgery law. "Of course Congress could 
broaden the concept of 'federal forgery' by statutory definition. We hold only that 
it has not yet done so." Id. at 659. 
35. The purpose of the addition of § 889-b to the Penal Law was to make the 
penalty for the forgery of doctors' prescriptions more severe, not to expand the deli• 
nition of forgery. This was explained by the sponsor of the bill to incorporate § 889-b 
into the Penal Law: "Its purpose is _to amend the Penal Law in relation to forging of 
doctor's prescriptions •..• I believe the bill will have a salutary effect in that it will 
make more severe the sentence in this type of case and may tend to discourage forgery 
of prescriptions." Brief for Defendant, p. 27, principal case, quoting Letter From Hon, 
Frank Composto to Governor's Counsel of the State of New York, March 9, 1954. 
36. See People v. Shapiro, 4 N.Y.2d 597, 601, 152 N.E.2d 65, 68, 176 N.Y.S.2d 632, 
635-36 (1958). 
37. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH I.Aw § 335l(l)(b). 
38. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH I.Aw § 3330. 
39. E.g., Stoltz v. Board of Regents, 4 App. Div. 2d 361, 165 N.Y.S.2d 179 (1957) 
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either of these sections is punishable by a maximum sentence of 
one year.40 
I£ it was desired to prosecute the defendant for the commission 
of a felony, another avenue was open. Although evidence of the dis-
position of the narcotics after they came into the defendant's posses-
sion would not be relevant to a charge of forgery, the subsequent 
administration of the drugs to an addict41 might have amounted to 
the illegal sale of narcotics. It has been held in one New York deci-
sion that the administration of drugs by a physician does not consti-
tute a sale,42 but it is questionable whether that decision still repre-
sents the law of New York, in light of the more recent case of De 
Pasquale v. Board of Regents.43 In the De Pasquale case a physician 
ordered narcotics from a pharmacist, disguising the order by pre-
scriptions purportedly issued to two of his patients suffering from 
cancer. The doctor gave the narcotics to . another person, allegedly 
for use by patients in a sanatorium, and for this act was held subject 
to conviction for the felony of unlawful sale of narcotics, for which 
a minimum sentence of seven years is prescribed.44 
It is difficult to see any meaningful distinction between the facts 
of De Pasquale and those of the principal case.45 However, even if 
the acts of the defendant in the principal case constituted only ad-
ministration of narcotics and not sales, it would seem to be a better 
policy to overrule the early New York case distinguishing between 
these acts than to redefine the criminal offense of forgery. It should 
be noted that under the federal narcotics law,46 which is similar to 
that of New York,47 no distinction is made between administering 
drugs and selling them, and the issuance of even a genuine prescrip-
tion to an addict to satisfy his habit is considered a sale.48 Perhaps 
{physician who issued prescriptions for narcotics in false names and supplied the drugs 
to an addict, convicted of a violation of N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAw § 335l(l)(b)); People v. 
Greenwood, 139 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sup. Ct. 1955). See also Matter of Grossman v. Hilleboe, 
16 App. Div. 2d 893, 228 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1962) (prosecution of physician under N.Y. 
Pun. HEALTH LAW § 3330). 
40. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1751-a(l). 
41. The defendant gave daily injections of morphine to one of his former patients 
who had become addicted to this drug. Brief for Defendant, p. 15, principal case. 
42. In Tonis v. Board of Regents, 295 N.Y. 286, 67 N.E.2d 245 (1946), it was held 
that the listing in series of "sell, prescribe, administer and dispense" in N.Y. Pun. 
HEALTH LAw § 3305 (1954) indicated that for the purposes of the section each of 
these acts differs from the others. 
43. 7 App. Div. 2d 692, 179 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1958). 
44. N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1751-(1). 
45. In the principal case the defendant directly administered the drugs obtained 
unlawfully and in the De. Pasquale case the drugs were given to a second party to 
administer. Thus, in both cases the drugs were given to one prohibited by law from 
receiving them. 
46. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 4705(a). 
47. Compare INT. R.Ev. CoDE OF 1954; § 4705(a), with N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1751(1). 
48. See Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189 (1920); Manning v. 'United 
States, 31 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1929). . 
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the simplest solution to the problem presented in the principal case 
would be for the legislature to increase the penalty for making false 
statements in a prescription for narcotics from a misdemeanor with 
a one-year maximum prison term to a felony with a higher statutory 
limit on imprisonment.49 
A serious constitutional question may be raised by the simulta-
neous existence in the New York statutes of section 889-b of the 
Penal Law and section 335l(l)(b) of the Public Health Law. The 
former section punishes the forgery of doctors' prescriptions as a 
felony; the latter punishes the same offense as a misdemeanor if the 
prescription is for narcotics. Thus the prosecutor can, in his unre-
viewable discretion, charge one who has forged a prescription for 
narcotics either with a felony or with a misdemeanor. Although the 
United States Supreme Court has never expressly passed on the 
issue, it has been forcefully suggested by two Justices that such dis-
cretion in a prosecutor denies a defendant equal protection and due 
process of law, unless some justifiable standards are set up to deter-
mine what classes of defendants are subject to the more severe pen-
alties.50 This reasoning has been applied by certain state courts to 
strike down statutes allowing the same acts to be punished as either 
felonies or misdemeanors.51 It would appear that the defendant in 
the principal case might successfully challenge the constitutionality 
of invoking the felony provisions against him, when other physicians 
had been prosecuted only for misdemeanors in similar situations.is2 
49. This policy was used by the legislature when N.Y. PEN. LAw § 889-b increased 
the penalty for the "true" forgery of a doctor's prescription from a misdemeanor to 
a felony. See Letter From Hon. Frank Composto, supra note 35. 
50. Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131, 138-39 (1956) (dissenting opinion of Black, 
J., joined by Douglas, J.). In the Berra case the acts of the defendant, essentially 
constituting income tax evasion, could have been prosecuted under Int. Rev. Code of 
1939, § 145(b), for which the penalties were a $10,000 fine or imprisonment for five 
years, or under Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3616•a, as a misdemeanor having maximum 
penalties of a $1,000 fine or imprisonment for one year or both. Mr. Justice Black 
stated: 
I think we should construe these sections so as not to place control over the 
liberty of citizens in the unreviewable discretion of one individual-a result 
which seems wholly incompatible with our system of justice. Since Congress has 
specifically made the conduct charged a misdemeanor, I would not permit the 
prosecution for a felony under the broad language of Section 145(b}. Criminal 
statutes ..• should be construed narrowly, not broadly •••• This basic principle 
is flouted if either of these statutes can be elected as the controlling law at the 
whim of a prosecuting attorney. • • . A Congressional delegation of such vast 
powers would raise serious Constitutional questions." Berra v. United States, 
supra at 138-40. 
Where suitable standards are set up for distinguishing between classes of defendants, 
there is no denial of due process or equal protection of the law. See Hutcherson v. 
United States, 345 'F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
51. State v. Pirkey, 203 Ore. 697, 281 P.2d 698 (1955); Olsen v. Delmore, 48 Wash. 
2d 545,295 P.2d 324 (1956). But cf. People v. Twitchell, 8 Utah 2d 314, 333 P.2d 1075 
(1959). 
52. See note 39 supra. The fact that the defendant in the principal case received 
a suspended sentence does not remove the severe consequences of a felony conviction. 
Recent Developments
The court in the principal case, in response to an unlawful dis-
tribution of narcotics, expanded New York's law of forgery to en-
compass this offense, ignoring the boundaries that have traditionally
defined that crime in New York. It is clear that under the Revised
Penal Law, effective January 1, 1967, this course will not be open
to the courts. Statutory re-interpretation or amendment will be
necessary if, in the interest of deterrence, it is felt that a physician
who unlawfully administers narcotics must be prosecuted for a
felony.
Under N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 6514(1), the license of a physician convicted of a felony may
be revoked without a hearing.
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